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Abstract
This paper shows how non-individualistic preferences can be individual tness
maximizing in market-integrated societies. In the model, individuals share an en-
dowment, which is used for consumption and/or purchase of goods on the external
market. We show that inequity aversion about endowment distribution can be
an optimal response to merchantsprice discrimination. Then, assuming that in-
creased consumption means increased individual tness, we argue that evolutionary
selection can favor inequity-averse preferences. We also argue that our model can
explain the empirical nding of Henrich et al. (2004) about the positive e¤ect of a
societys exposure to markets on its memberssociality.
JEL: A10, C73, D63
Keywords: Inequity aversion, endogenous preferences, preference evolution, mar-
ket exposure, cross-societal di¤erences.
1 Introduction
The nding that people have a preference for equity of money distribution remains the
object of much controversy among economists. As vast empirical evidence on people
sharing money shows, alongside their own pecuniary interest, people also care about
the money shares other people, even thoroughly unknown to them, receive from money
division (for a comprehensive review, see Fehr & Schmidt (2006)). Furthermore, cross-
country studies not only prove the ubiquity of inequity-averse preferences but also show
that peoples revealed amount of equity is very similar across di¤erent countries (see,
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e.g., Roth et al. (1991)). This eventually has led to the thought that other-regarding
preferences are more characteristic of human nature than selsh ones, with the latter being
an artifact of conventional economic modeling. (See Fehr & Schmidt (1999); Bolton &
Ockenfels (2000); Charness & Rabin (2002) for popular representations of other-regarding
preferences.) However, as argued in Henrich (2000), this nding and conclusion may
not be as universal as been suggested and may pertain only to modern industrialized
societies. Henrich (2000) a study on the economic behavior of the Machiguenga Indians
of the Peruvian Amazon shows that the preferences of Machiguenga Indians revealed
in experiments are rather own-regarding than other-regarding, setting forth the question
about the foundations and evolution of human behavior and sociality observed in modern
societies.
In order to see if the nding of Henrich (2000) constitutes a phenomenon beyond
the society studied, a large project was initiated to obtain more evidence on indigenous
peoples economic behavior from di¤erent small-scale traditional societies from around
the world. Arguably, by studying traditional societies it allows us to catch a glimpse of
modern peoples preferences as of an early stage of their social cohabiting the founda-
tions of human sociality and the further evolution of those preferences. This project,
documented in Henrich et al. (2001) and Henrich et al. (2004), consisted of carrying
out economic experiments with members of the traditional societies studied. Among
main ndings is the existence of several between-group di¤erences in peoples revealed
amount of sociality. One of the di¤erences the object of this paper is that members
of a market-integrated society (as measured, primarily, by the societys exposure to mar-
ket exchange) behave on average more pro-socially (i.e., share more with others) than
do members of an isolated society. To put it di¤erently, the form of peoples (including
modern peoples) preferences could be forged by the socioeconomic environment people
live in.1 Henrich et al. (2004, p.5051) leave open the question of what explains the
discovered empirical pattern, calling for more research on this important nding:
The challenge is to understand how and why unselsh behaviors and
motives could evolve in the face of the material advantages accruing to selsh
individuals.
And the current paper attempts to contribute toward a better understanding of this.
In this paper, we o¤er an evolutionary argument for the endogeneity of peoples pref-
erences documented in Henrich et al. (2001) and Henrich et al. (2004). We present
1Relatedly, Buchan et al. (2009) nd a positive link between a societys level of globalization and
socialness of its members. Among other evidence on the endogeneity of peoples preferences, Buchan et al.
(2002) document cross-cultural di¤erences in peoples propensity to trust and reciprocate. Herrmann
et al. (2008) report a cross-societal variation in peoples pro- and anti-social punishment behavior
revealed in public goods experiments and link this variation to di¤erences in norms of civic cooperation
and the importance of the rule of law across countries. Bowles (1998) o¤ers a systematic review of related
theoretical and empirical literature.
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a model in which a societys exposure to market exchange can favor the evolution of
inequity-averse preferences for money distribution, whereas selsh preferences prevail in
isolated societies. The idea is that in a market-integrated society inequity aversion with
respect to money distribution can attenuate the scope of (external) merchantsprice dis-
crimination and, subsequently, improve terms of trade with them ultimately leading to
higher consumption levels of the societys members. Then, with the assumption that
increased consumption means increased individual tness, inequity-averse preferences for
money distribution can be individual tness (i.e., own consumption) maximizing and
eventually be favored by cultural selection through enculturation.2
As a simple example, illustrating the idea of this paper, consider an extended dictator
game with consumption. There are two identical individuals and an exogenous endow-
ment of size 1. Let the dictator be randomly chosen from the two individuals to split the
endowment between them. Suppose that the endowment distribution resulting from a
split is public information, but the individualsown endowment shares are their private
information. An individuals utility of an endowment share is equal to the number of
units consumed of the only non-divisible good available on the external market that the
individual can a¤ord with his share. And the utility of the unspent endowment share is
of a second order compared with the utility from the consumption of the external good
(but an individual prefers more endowment everything else equal). Suppose there is a
monopolist producer on the external market, who produces the good at some constant
marginal cost of, say, 0:1. After learning about the endowment distribution, the producer
charges the take-it-or-leave-it price for a unit of the good that maximizes her prots from
following simultaneous trades with the two individuals. Within the setting described,
what is the optimal endowment sharing rule that maximizes the dictators utility? Obvi-
ously, it is not optimal for the dictator to keep all the endowment for himself. Because if
he does so, the producer targets only the rich individual, i.e., the dictator, by setting the
price equal to the size of the endowment, i.e., to 1, leaving the dictator with only one unit
of the good consumed. Instead, the dictator could increase his consumption by giving the
other individual a portion of the endowment large enough to make the prot-maximizing
producer set the price aimed at both individuals, which would leave the dictator with
some consumer surplus (or rather information rent) and more units consumed. (In our
example, if the dictator gives the other individual 1=3 keeping 2=3 of the endowment for
2With regard to evolutionary selection, the emphasis in this paper is on the cultural transmission of
behavioral traits (through enculturation) rather than on the much slower genetical transmission (through
inheritance and mutation). As discussed in Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981), the cultural transmission
in the form of vertical (parents to children) and horizontal (between any individuals) transmitions
turned more important in shaping peoples behavioral (social and individual) traits when their social
groups increased in complexity and size (after the introduction of agricultural practices some 10,000
years ago). The purpose of cultural transmission here is to have a much faster selection for traits (to
take place at least within the lifespan of homo sapiens, but which normally takes several generations
only) and to have a similar qualitative character of evolutionary dynamics as in models with genetical
transmission (Bergstrom (2002)).
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himself, then the producer nds it optimal to set the price equal to 1=3, and the dictator
enjoys two units consumed.)
The main nding of this example is that, in the presence of market exchange, by
sharing with others one can increase the purchasing power of ones own, even diminished,
share and, consequently, obtain more consumption. (Conversely, in the absence of market
exchange, there are no own-consumption gains from sharing with others.) We can think
of two approaches to relate this nding with the phenomenon of inequity aversion. The
rst is a rationalistic approach. In the above example, from a conventional utility function
of consumption we obtain a non-monotonic indirect utility function of money (endow-
ment), which can be interpreted to have underlying inequity-averse preferences for money
distribution. Hence, it may be that inequity aversion is indistinguishable from rational
(in terms of own-consumption maximization) behavior. However, this interpretation is
inconsistent with empirical evidence on peoples behavior in laboratory money-sharing
experiments. If people are that rational to share with others in order to obtain a strategic
advantage for future interactions, then they should also realize that no strategic advan-
tage can be obtained from sharing in laboratory experiments, which, nevertheless, they
abundantly engage in. This suggests that when facing a money-sharing decision to make
people may maximize something else than their consumption utility.
The second approach about the above nding, which is also the approach of this
paper, is that in societies exposed to market exchange people with inequity-averse pref-
erences for money distribution obtain a higher material payo¤ than those with selsh
preferences. Being more successful, inequity-averse preferences, therefore, are likelier to
survive evolutionary pressures; accordingly, the mode of behavior induced by these pref-
erences becomes more common in market-integrated societies. The converse is true for
isolated societies obsolete in the modern industrialized world possibly explaining why
we may observe more individualistic behavior in some traditional societies not observed
elsewhere.
In this paper, we develop the above ideas into a formal model with evolution of pref-
erences. The essential feature of the model is that we measure evolutionary tness not in
terms of monetary returns, which are the direct object of peoples decision making, but in
terms of the consumption that those monetary returns can later a¤ord. More precisely, in
our model individuals possess subjective preferences for money distribution, which they
maximize when they share an endowment. But individualsobjective payo¤s, or their
objective utility with underlying objective preferences, are the consumption levels that
their own endowment shares resulted from their actions (dictated, respectively, by their
subjective preferences) lead to. Then, we raise the question what subjective prefer-
ences generate the highest objective payo¤s and, correspondingly, survive evolutionary
pressures.3
3In a similar fashion, Huck & Oechssler (1999) develop an evolutionary argument for revengeful
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As we show, because of strategic sharing externalities ensuing from a societys expo-
sure to market exchange inequity-averse preferences for money distribution can render a
higher consumption level than that rendered by individualistic preferences and, subse-
quently, the former are favored by cultural selection. We adopt the indirectevolutionary
approach with unobservable preferences (Ely & Yilankaya (2001)), when showing that the
behavior predicted by our model is equilibrium evolutionary stable. Applying the stan-
dard approach to our model (Weibull (1995)) would render the same results since all the
modeling steps undertaken can be equivalently expressed in the terms of the standard
approach, as briey discussed later.
This paper also contributes to the evolutionary literature by providing a distinct and
empirically supported argument on how non-individualistic preferences in the individual
selection framework can survive evolutionary pressures. Typically, evolutionary models
in favor of non-individualistic preferences require either a group-selection argument in
the standard approach (for a review, see Bergstrom (2002)) or certain informational
assumptions about the observability of otherspreferences in the indirectapproach (for
a concrete example, see Bester & Güth (1998); for a more general argument, see Güth &
Yaari (1992); Dekel et al. (2007)). This paper, however, bypasses all of the above: the
result primarily hinges on the strategic sharing e¤ects described.4 Therefore, this paper
instead falls into the game of lifeparadigm, arguing that peoples behavior should be
examined in a wider social context (see Binmore (1994, 1998); or Güth & Napel (2006)
for an example related to the evolution of inequity-averse preferences).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop and solve
a model. In Section 3, we discuss the results obtained, link them to empirical studies,
and o¤er some extensions. The last section concludes the study.
2 Model
2.1 Framework
With an allusion to the haystack model of Maynard Smith (1964), consider a river with
a large number of small villages situated along its banks. Suppose that every village is
dwelled by N farmers, randomly drawn from the population of farmers, and that there
is occasional, but relatively infrequent migration of farmers between villages.
In a village, the farmers joint work results in a publicly observed harvest surplus,
behavior presuming that the individual subjective payo¤ and subsequent evolutionary tness resulting
from strategies employed are not equivalent. The general models of evolution of preferences (see Ely &
Yilankaya (2001); Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001); Dekel et al. (2007)) also di¤erentiate between peoples
subjective and objective preferences.
4Certainly, this paper is not unique in showing how individual selection can favor pro-social prefer-
ences. For instance, Becker (1976) presents a model in which egoists take actions as though they had
altruistic preferences in order to benet from othersaltruism.
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henceforth, the endowment S. The farmers split the endowment among themselves,
which results in a vector of endowment shares s = (s1; :::; sN) : si 2 [0; S] and isi = S.
Let the endowment distribution in the village, ensuing from an endowment split, be public
information, while an individual farmers share is his private information. If used for own
consumption, an endowment share s renders a farmer a material payo¤ of U0(s) with
derivatives U0s > 0 and U
0
ss < 0. The material payo¤ U
0(s) also denotes the reservation
utility of an endowment share s. In the event the village is exposed to trades with external
merchants (who do not belong to the population of farmers), endowment shares can also
be used as a means of exchange, i.e., as money, to purchase goods from merchants.5
Merchants reach farmers by the river. Suppose they can o¤er one type of goods the
good which, on the other hand, can be produced in various quality q > 0 with cost
function C(q); Cq > 0; Cqq > 0, and limq!0C(q) = 0. The returns to scale from producing
a given variety are constant. Merchants o¤er farmers a take-it-or-leave-it menu of price-
quality (p; q) bundles of the good to choose from, where a price p is gauged in terms of
the endowment. In their trade with farmers, merchants maximize their expected prots
(returns less production costs), given the income distribution observed in the village,
farmersdemand, and market competition, described more precisely below.
Assume that every farmer has a demand for at most one variety of the good. The
consumption of a (p; q) variety of the good and of the remainder of an endowment share s
renders a farmer a material payo¤of UG(s p; q); UGs > 0; UGss < 0; UGq > 0; UGqq < 0; UGsq >
0. A farmer considers purchasing a variety (p; q) only if it results in a non-negative net
utility level U , dened as
U(q; s; p)  UG(s  p; q)  U0(s)
with properties Us > 0; Uss < 0; Uq > 0; Uqq < 0; and Uqs > 0.6 Furthermore, given a
menu of price-quality bundles, a farmer chooses the bundle, if any, that maximizes his
net utility U . Also, farmers have no bargaining power in their trade with merchants.
Finally, we consider three di¤erent scenarios of the external market structure. The
rst one is autarky: merchants are absent (e.g., some villages, situated high up the river,
are not reachable). The second one is monopoly (some villages are reachable by only few
merchants). The third one is perfect competition (other villages are reachable by many
5In the framework described, the farmers are chosen to allude to the historical division of labor
into farmers, nomads, and merchants, which could potentially serve as a real life example for the
subsequent argument about the cultural selection of inequity-averse preferences for money distribution.
In addition, with farmereconomy it is intended to refer to the traditional societies in Henrich et al.
(2004), empirical ndings of which our model aims to explain.
6All the listed properties of the utility function U are related to consumer preferences for normal goods
(see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). In particular, the positive partial derivative Us implies that a richer
individual derives a higher utility from the consumption of the good (due to, say, smaller opportunity
costs). Similarly, the positive cross derivative Uqs can be interpreted as meaning that a richer consumer
values quality more (which also follows from the convexity of the Engel curves for high-quality goods).
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merchants).
2.2 Game of Life and Selection
2.2.1 Sharing rule and subjective preferences
In every village, Nature randomly selects a farmer to be the dictator, who at own
discretion is to divide the endowment into a vector of shares s.7
Suppose that farmers have subjective preferences for endowment division. Let these
preferences be characterized by the subjective utility function US such that a farmer is
utility from an endowment division s is
USi (s) = si   i
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
g (max fsj   si; 0g)  (1)
  i 1
N   1
X
j 6=i
g (max fsi   sj; 0g) ;
where si is own endowment share, i 2 [; ], 0      1, and i 2

; 

, 0 
    1, are subjective preference parameters, initially distributed in the population
according to some non-degenerate distribution, and g is a strictly convex function. The
second term of (1) measures the utility loss from disadvantageous inequality, and the
third term measures the loss from advantageous inequality.8 In what follows, the interest
lies in the third term of (1) and, therefore, for simplicity we assume that i = i.
A farmer i, when selected to be the dictator, maximizes his subjective utility USi with
respect to endowment division s. Let the dictators share be s1 in an endowment division
s. To save on notation, we drop the subscript from the dictators utility US.
2.2.2 Optimal division
The endowment division that maximizes the dictators subjective utility is given by
s = argmax
s
US(s): (2)
7As for the endowment sharing rule, we adopt the dictator-game framework, which is done for mod-
eling convenience and also to show that inequity aversion can arise even under such an extreme form
of endowment sharing. The main results are also robust against other sharing rules as, e.g., in the ul-
timatum game. What matters in the end is the presence of strategic e¤ects from sharing. We discuss
robustness later in the text.
8This utility function is essentially as in Fehr & Schmidt (1999), except for the function g. The role of
this function is to have the marginal rate of substitution between own share and endowment inequality
non-constant (unlike in Fehr & Schmidt (1999)), needed in our model to obtain di¤erent endowment
divisions for di¤erent subjective preference parameters.
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We can immediately make two observations about s. First,
s1 = max(s
);
i.e., the dictators share has to be the highest. (Otherwise, roughly speaking, the dictator
can increase his utility by redistributing the di¤erence between the highest share and his
own share equally among all the farmers with lower shares.) The second observation is
that all the other farmers in the group get equal shares:
si = (S   s1)=(N   1); i  2.
From the rst observation, we can ignore the second term in (1). Then, because of
the convexity of function g the maximum of US is reached when the remainder of the
endowment is distributed equally among the other farmers.
Having said that, the optimal division s is fully characterized by the dictators share
s1 only, which, in turn, is determined by his subjective preference parameter . Let
~s :

; 
! [0; S] map a subjective parameter  into s1 of s in (2). Finally, in order to
have a one-to-one mapping between  and s1, we restrict the domain

; 

to be such
that ~s is a strictly monotone function with ~s() = S (perfect selshness) and ~s() = S=N
(perfect inequity aversion).9
2.2.3 Objective payo¤s and the veil of ignorance
A farmers objective payo¤ from an endowment division s his evolutionary tness is
measured by the resulting consumption utility U0 or UG, which depends both on own
endowment share si and on the menu of consumption bundles o¤ered by merchants (i.e.,
on what the farmer can a¤ord with his share).
Merchants design a menu of consumption bundles distinctly for every village after they
learn about endowment distribution there. Obviously, the prot-maximizing menu is not
invariant to di¤erent endowment distributions in a village. The assumption is that farmers
cannot discern for themselves what menu will be o¤ered by merchants and, subsequently,
what objective payo¤s their actions over endowment split will result in. Instead, they
can be thought of as living behind the veil of ignorance about external markets or
about what game of lifethey are part of. Therefore, if selected, a farmer divides the
endowment according to his subjective preference only without making any prediction
about what objective payo¤s will result from his action at the end of the game of life.
9In what follows, we use the indirect evolutionary approach (Güth & Yaari (1992) and Ely &
Yilankaya (2001)), where players rationally maximize their subjective preferences. Alternatively, we could
think of the farmers as being pre-programmed to split the endowment keeping ~s(i) and dividing
equally the rest as in the standard evolutionary approach, see Weibull (1995). Due to the specicity of
the game studied, here the two approaches render identical results (which is not necessarily the case in
general; see, e.g., Huck & Oechssler (1999)).
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Furthermore, the knowledge of other farmerspreferences or the population distribution
of preferences is irrelevant for this dictator-like game (which is generally not the case in
models with preference evolution; see, e.g., Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001) or Dekel et al.
(2007)).
2.2.4 Games of life
Given the three external market structures, we distinguish, respectively, three games
of life that farmers in every village can be part of. Each game of life comprises three
stages. In the rst stage, the farmers (in every village) play the dictator game   =
fi; s^i; E(USi )gNi=1, where i 2

; 

is a farmer is subjective inequity-aversion parame-
ter, s^i 2 [0; S] is a farmer is endowment share kept for himself if selected to be the dictator
(with the rest of the endowment, S  s^i, being divided equally among the other farmers),
and E(USi ) is his expected subjective utility from a strategy prole s^ = (s^1; :::; s^N). In
the second stage, after observing the resultant endowment distribution in the village,
merchants design a menu of price-quality bundles f(pj; qj)gmj=1, where m is the number
of bundles o¤ered. And in the third stage, simultaneous trades take place; prots and
consumption utilities are realized.
With merchants being prot maximizing and farmers  consumption maximizing in
the second and third stages, respectively, each game of life can be reduced to one of
the following extended dictator gameswith expected consumption payo¤s. Dene the
three games of life by  k = fs^i;ki gNi=1, where k = A; M; and C stand for the di¤erent
market structures studied: autarky, monopoly, and competition, respectively. As in game
 , a strategy s^i 2 [0; S] is an endowment share kept for oneself with the rest of S   s^i
divided equally among the other farmers; ki (s^) is a farmer is expected consumption
utility from a strategy prole s^ = (s^1; :::; s^N) with the merchantsand farmersoptimal
play at the later stages accounted for. The exact form of ki is specied later for each
game separately.
2.2.5 Preference evolution
For each game of life studied, we tackle the question of what subjective preferences,
characterized by parameter , are favored by cultural selection, with their share in the
population (of a village) increasing at the expense of other less successful preferences.
The approach is that of preference evolution or indirectevolution with a static stability
concept of equilibrium so that in equilibrium no mutation (resulting, say, from an inux
of other preference types due to migration of farmers) can give a higher material payo¤
than that of the incumbent types (Güth & Yaari (1992), Ely & Yilankaya (2001)). Based
on the results of Ely & Yilankaya (2001), in our games of life studied, evolution selects
those subjective preferences that lead to the choice of equilibrium strategies of the game
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of life in question. And we call those subjective preferences evolutionary stable.10
In our model, evolutionary stable preferences are those that yield the greatest con-
sumption payo¤. If s^k is an equilibrium strategy in game of life  k, then an evolutionary
stable subjective preference parameter is k = ~s 1(s^k).
2.3 Equilibrium Play
Case 1: Autarky
Consider game  A, where the farmers are not exposed to any external trades, making it
a standard Nplayer dictator game. The material payo¤ from an endowment share s is
U0(s). Given a strategy prole s^ = (s^1; :::; s^N), the expected consumption utility to a
farmer i is
Ai (s^) =
1
N
U0(s^i) +
1
N
X
j 6=i
U0

S   s^j
N   1

:
The rst term of Ai is the farmers utility of the endowment share s^i kept for himself
when selected to be the the dictator, multiplied by the probability of being the dictator,
and the second term is the sum of expected utilities of own endowment shares when other
farmers divide the endowment. Since own strategy s^i has no e¤ect on the second term of
Ai , the unique equilibrium strategy for all the farmers is
s^A = S;
because of U0s > 0.
Hence, the evolutionary stable preference type is
A = ~s 1(S) = :
In other words, in autarky selsh types prevail.
Case 2: Monopoly
In game  M , in order to specify a farmer is expected consumption utility Ai , rst, we
need backwardly to solve for the optimal consumption bundles o¤ered by the monopolist
prot-maximizing merchant for a given endowment distribution.
After an endowment split in the village, the merchant observes the resultant endow-
ment distribution with the support (s1; s2), s1  s2; s1 + s2 = S; and the probabilities
10Ely & Yilankaya (2001) studies nite games, while in our model the action space is allowed to be
innite: s^i 2 [0; S]. However, since we design our games in such a way that the existence of equilibrium is
not an issue, then the results of Ely & Yilankaya (2001) apply to our setting as well despite a continuous
action space. Alternatively, we could make our games studied nite by simply discretizing the players
action and preference spaces, and then the results of Ely & Yilankaya (2001) would apply directly. For
pitfalls lying with using continuous action spaces, see Oechssler & Riedel (2002).
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1=N and (N   1)=N , respectively (this is because the dictator splits the remaining part
of the endowment equally among the other farmers). Since individual shares are private
information, the design of consumption bundles is a hidden-information problem for the
merchant (Mussa & Rosen (1978)). With at most two distinct endowment levels in a
village, the merchant o¤ers the villagers at most two consumption bundles, respectively.
We also assume that once the menu of bundles is o¤ered, it is not subject to change. By
this assumption, we rule out the possibility of the merchants updating her beliefs about
prospective buyerswealth distribution after some trade has taken place (alternatively,
we can assume that at the last stage only one trade with a random farmer takes place).
The merchants problem is to design the menu of bundles f(p1; q1); (p2; q2)g that max-
imizes her prot
1
N
(p1   C(q1)) + N   1
N
(p2   C(q2))
subject to the incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality constraints, respectively,
U(qi; si; pi)  U(qj; si; pj)
U(qi; si; pi)  0; i = 1; 2 and j 6= i:
A closed form solution to the merchants problem can be obtained only if we assume the
utility function U to take a specic form, e.g., to be quasi-linear in price p. However, the
general properties of the solution are invariant to the form of the utility function U given
its properties (the concavity, Uqq < 0, and the single-crossing property, Uqs > 0, see, e.g.,
Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Ch.14)).
In particular, unless the merchant nds it optimal to serve only the richer farmer, the
optimal menu of bundles f(p1; q1); (p2; q2)g has the individual rationality constraint of the
poorer farmers and the incentive compatibility constraint of the richer farmer binding (the
single-crossing property ensures that the other incentive compatibility constraint holds).
In this case, the richer farmer enjoys some positive information rent U(q1; s1; p1) > 0,
while a poorer farmer has none. But if the merchant nds it optimal to shut down on
the poorer farmer which happens when the di¤erence in endowment shares, s1   s2, is
large enough then the merchant serves only the richer farmer but leaves him with no
information rents.
All in all, if we denote the shutdown value, determined endogenously from the mer-
chants problem, by s, then for the values of a poorer farmers endowment share s2 above
s, but with s2 < s1, the merchant serves both the rich and the poor, with the net utilities
U(q1; s1; p1) > 0 and U(q2; s2; p2) = 0, respectively. If we have s2  s or s1 = s2, i.e.,
when the dictator makes a very unequal split or makes it equal, the merchant designs
only one non-zero bundle (p1; q1), but for which the net utility is U(q1; s1; p1) = 0. (The
assumption is made that in case the merchant is indi¤erent between serving both types
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or just the rich type she serves the rich type only; but it is immaterial for the analysis to
follow.)
Given the merchants optimal design of consumption bundles, a farmers indirect
material utility function Y of own endowment share s is given by
Y (s) =
8><>:
U0(s) if 0  s  S=N;
U0(s) + U(q1; s; p1) if S=N < s < S   (N   1)s;
U0(s) if S   (N   1)s  s  S;
(3)
where (p1; q1) is the consumption bundle designed for the richer farmer (which is itself a
function of an endowment share s); and s is the threshold endowment share discussed
above.
Hence, in game  M , a farmer is expected material payo¤ (evolutionary tness) is
Mi (s^) =
1
N
Y (s^i) +
1
N
X
j 6=i
Y

S   s^j
N   1

: (4)
Again, since a farmers own action has no inuence on the second term of M but only on
its rst term, the expected payo¤ Mi for every farmer i is maximized when his indirect
utility Y in (3) is maximized.
From function denition (3), we see that for the endowment shares s in the interval
(S=N; S (N 1)s) the material utility Y is increased by the information rent U(q1; s; p1)
over the reservation utility U0(s). For other values of s, the material utility is equal to
the reservation utility U0(s) only (because the merchant leaves no information rents if
the endowment distribution is very unequal). Assuming that there exists the maximizer
of function Y over the restriction (S=N; S   (N   1)s), denote it by
s = argmax(Y (s) j S=N < s < S   (N   1)s): (5)
Since the reservation utility U0 is strictly increasing, then the function value Y (s) is the
global maximum if
Y (s)  Y (S)
or
UG(s  p1; q1)  U0(S): (6)
In other words, it is not obvious from the material payo¤perspective whether the dictator
should keep all the endowment for himself (and maximize his reservation utility U0) or
keep s and divide equally the remainder S   s among the other farmers (and enjoy
some information rent). For condition (6) to hold, the size of information rent matters,
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which, on the other hand, is dependent on the form of the utility functions U0 and
UG. Intuitively, condition (6) is likely to hold when farmers after a certain point become
quickly satiated with the consumption of their own endowment and value the outside good
highly enough. (See the numerical example following this subsection that illustrates the
points raised.)
Returning to evolutionary tness expression (4), if condition (6) holds (also suppose
that if we have Y (s) = Y (S) then a farmer prefers the less unequal split), then the unique
equilibrium strategy s^M for all the farmers is
s^M = s;
and the evolutionary stable preference type is
M = ~s 1(s) > :
On the other hand, if condition (6) does not hold, then the unique equilibrium strategy
s^M for all the farmers is
s^M = S;
and the evolutionary stable preference type is
M = ~s 1(S) = :
Case 3: Perfect competition
Consider game  C , where there are many competing merchants on the external market.
Here, unlike in the previous case, we have a competitive screening problem. Given that
every competing merchants prot is equal to 0, the price p of any variety (p; q) o¤ered
has to be equal to the total cost C(q) of producing the quality q. In a competitive
equilibrium, a variety (ps; qs) aimed at a farmer with an endowment level s has the
quality qs maximizing the farmers utility UG or his net utility U such that
Uq(qs; s; ps) = Us(qs; s; ps)Cq(qs);
where ps = C(qs).
As it immediately follows from the envelope theorem, unlike in the monopoly case, the
net utility U always strictly increases in own endowment share s (because of the direct
derivative Us > 0). The expected material payo¤Ci for every farmer i from the strategy
prole s^ of endowment demands is
Ci (s^) =
1
N

U0(s^i) + U(qi; s^i; pi)

+
1
N
X
j 6=i
h
U0(s#j ) + U(qi; s
#
j ; pi)
i
;
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where s#j = (S   s^j)=(N   1) and qi and pi are the competitive quality and price levels
aimed at endowment level s^i. Since dU=ds^i > 0, Ci is maximized for all i at
s^C = S:
Hence, in game  C , the unique evolutionary stable preference type is
C = ~s 1(S) = ;
i.e., in perfect competition selsh types prevail.
Summary
The proposition below summarizes the resultant evolutionary stable preferences for the
games of life studied.
Proposition 1 The evolutionary stable preference types  with respect to endowment
distribution are
 in game  A, autarky,  A = ;
 in game  M , monopoly,  if condition (6) holds, then M = ~s 1(s) > , where
s < S is dened by (5) and ~s 1 is the inverse of the mapping ~s from a preference
type to the optimal own endowment share; otherwise, M = ; and
 in game  C, perfect competition,  C = :
With regard to the link between market concentration and the type of evolutionary
stable preferences, a more general prediction would be that the more concentrated the
markets are, the more pro-social the preferences evolve.11 In other words, with more
competitive markets and, accordingly, with less price discrimination, income inequality
has weaker adverse e¤ects on the consumption utility of the rich.
11In our model, to study formally the link between market concentration and evolutionary stable type
of preference, we can proceed as follows. Assume that the probability f of collusion among merchants to
form a monopolist cartel decreases with the number of merchants L, where f(1) = 1 and limL!1 f(L) =
0. If merchants fail to collude, then there is perfect competition among them. Now, a farmer is expected
payo¤ of a prole of endowment shares demanded s^ is given by
Li (s^) = f(L)
M
i (s^) + (1  f(L))Ci (s^);
where Mi and 
C
i are a farmer is evolutionary tness in monopolist and competitive markets, re-
spectively. Since Ci (s^) > 
M
i (s^) the consumer surplus in the competitive market is greater than the
information rent in the monopolist market with the number of merchants L increasing, i.e., with the
competitive market turning likelier, the share s^L maximizing Li , correspondingly, increases to benet
from a higher consumer surplus available in the competitive market even at the expense of a smaller
(continuously decreasing around the maximizer s^M ) information rent in the monopolist market.
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Numerical example
Here we illustrate the results obtained for the case with the monopolist merchant. Con-
sider the following specication of the model. A farmers reservation utility of his own
endowment share s 2 [0; S] is given by U0(s) = sa, where 0 < a < 1; the utility from
the consumption of a (p; q) variety given a share s is UG(s   p; q) = (1 + q)(s   p)a so
that UG(s  0; 0) = U0(s).12 The merchants production function is given by C(q) = qb,
where b > 1. Let the parameters take the following values: the group size N = 2, the
endowment S = 50; the cost function parameter b = 2, and the consumption utility para-
meter a = 0:5; 0:7; and 0:9. (We estimate the model for di¤erent values of a to illustrate
the sensitivity of results with respect to di¤erent importance levels of own endowment
consumption for material utility, as discussed when deriving condition (6)).
For this specication of the model, the numerically obtained values of the indirect
utility function Y in (3) are plotted in Figure 1 below.13 On the horizontal axis, we have
own endowment shares s, and on the vertical axis we have the resultant utility levels Y
(given the merchants optimal play). The three graphs plot the indirect utility levels for
the three di¤erent consumption parameter a values. The coordinates of the maximum
points are given in bold and are contrasted with the coordinates of the other maximum
candidate points. As we can see from the graph, when the value of a is not too high, i.e.,
when farmers do not value own produce (i.e., own endowment) too much relatively to the
outside good, we have that farmers achieve the highest material utility by sharing with
others (see the plots for a = 0:5 and 0:7). For this example, it can be shown that the lower
the values the parameter a takes, the more the farmers gain from sharing. The condition
equivalent to (6) when farmers are better o¤ sharing with others is that a < 0:749.
2.4 Robustness
The assumptions of the model presented may appear quite specic and may be thought
of as the key drivers of the results obtained. For instance, the random dictator game used
as an endowment sharing rule is hardly the most accurate image of the real life. However,
this sharing rule is not what drives the results of the model, which are robust, essentially,
to any sharing rule. The main conclusion of the model can be stated in the following way:
Even under the most selshness-enhancing sharing rule (as is, supposedly, the dictator
game) sharing with others can still evolve. To put it di¤erently, under any endowment
sharing rule if an endowment division turns very unequal (up to the point when it hurts
even the richest), then there is room for (Pareto-)improvement among the farmers by
12With this form of UG we do not have the strict concavity assumed in the paper, but for this
example it is immaterial. Otherwise, at the expense of some more computation, we could have used
UG(s  p; q) = (1 + q)z(s  p)a with z < 1.
13The model was solved using Matlab and its function fsolve to solve systems of nonlinear equations.
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redistributing some endowment proceeds from the rich to the poor.14 From some di¤er-
ent perspective, in societies with (Pareto-)improving redistribution e¤ects present (such
as market-integrated societies) we are more likely to see the development of pro-social
sharing rules and norms than in societies without these redistribution e¤ects.
Regarding informational assumptions endowment distribution is public information,
individual shares are private it is in the interest of farmers, at least, of some of them,
to make the endowment distribution known to merchants especially if some mutually
benecial gains from trade are not realized. Regarding the private information assump-
tion, it is not restrictive either. Under complete information, a rich individual can always
disguise his identity by hiringa poorer individual to trade with the monopolist mer-
chant on his behalf, which implies that the merchant cannot do better than designing an
incentive-compatible menu of bundles.
Finally, regarding price setting by the monopolist merchant, the screening device
adopted, arguably beyond the level of sophistication of early humans, is not behind the
main results either: non-discriminatory pricing, as shown in Introduction, leads to the
same qualitative results. What really drives the results of the model is the exposure to
markets, i.e., the presence of a relevant third party holding conicting interests.
14In a decentralized society, a Pareto-improving redistribution can be marred by the possibility of free
riding among rich individuals. However, the free-riding problem is less prevalent in small societies, which
traditional societies normally are.
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3 Discussion
3.1 Main Result
The primary purpose of our model is to o¤er an explanation for the empirical nding
that members of market-integrated societies reveal to have stronger pro-social prefer-
ences than do members of isolated societies (which more thoroughly discussed later in
this section). The results of our model, presented in Proposition 1, show: Evolution-
ary selection, based on individual tness maximization, is likelier to favor the evolution
of individualistic preferences in isolated societies and the evolution of inequity-averse
preferences in market-integrated societies (given high enough market concentration on
external markets and high enough valuation for external goods). Consequently, in the
two types of societies people can exhibit di¤erent behaviors induced by their di¤erent
preferences, as is empirically documented. The intuition behind this nding is that if a
society is exposed to market exchange then inequity aversion can attenuate the scope of
external merchantsprice discrimination and improve the societys terms of trade the
e¤ect absent in isolated societies.
If we attempt to take a more general stance, this paper shows how external factors
such as, among other things, exposure to market exchange can have an inuence on
peoples behavior and the shape of their preferences. In particular, besides genuinely
altruistic considerations for other people (frequently adhered to when explaining exper-
imental evidence on peoples behavior, e.g., Levine (1998)), people may also acquire a
preference for equity (of money distribution) in order to subdue a third partys adverse
impact on their welfare. (Another example of a third partys adverse impact, besides
rent extraction by merchants studied here, could be, for instance, levying income or
consumption taxes by the central tax authority that aims to maximize its tax revenues.)
Finally, this paper is not an attempt to explain the phenomenon of inequity aversion
observed in modern societies, which is by far more complex than this paper can possibly
grasp. In this regard, it should rather be seen as an attempt to provide an additional
insight or venue on how, besides many other factors, the phenomenon of inequity aversion
could have arisen in modern societies. However, even with the model studied here, its
ndings could turn relevant for explaining di¤erences in peoples revealed amount of so-
ciality between modern societies, which, even small, nevertheless still exist (see, e.g., Roth
et al. (1991)). Since this paper also predicts a positive and direct relationship between
market concentration and amount of peoples sociality, then, with this relationship empir-
ically tested, we could see if the postulated interdependence of peoples preferences and
economic environment is also relevant in modern times, which is left for future research.
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3.2 Empirical Evidence
Here, we give a short summary of empirical ndings on indigenous peoples behavior,
documented in Henrich et al. (2001) and Henrich et al. (2004).
As already mentioned in the introduction, in response to the nding of Henrich (2000),
which proves the behavior of Machiguenga Indians more selsh than that observed in
modern societies, a large project was started to inquire into this nding more thoroughly.
The aim of this project was to look into the foundations of human sociality and its ori-
gins with the help of studies on small-scale societies, which could possibly shed light on
the evolutionary transition of modern peoples preferences. Under this project, indige-
nous people from 15 di¤erent small-scale societies from around the world took part in
experiments consisting of their playing ultimatum, public good, and dictator games. The
results of this project are summarized in Henrich et al. (2001), and its full account is
given in Henrich et al. (2004).
After regressing the measure of sociality revealed by indigenous people in experiments
on their individual and societal characteristics, the contributors of this project discovered
several empirical regularities. First, there is considerably more behavioral variability
across the traditional societies studied than had been found in any study on modern
societies. Second, no individual-level economic or demographic variables can explain
any variation in behavior either within or across the societies. Lastly, the researchers
observed two between-group di¤erences in peoples behavior. The rst one is based on
the importance of cooperation in a societys economic production, and the second 
on the degree of market integration (as measured, primarily, by societiesexposure to
external markets). Together, these two factors account for about a half of the variation
among societies in mean ultimatum game o¤ers with each of these factors being equally
important.
The above ndings are obtained from a regression that uses the data pooled from all
the societies studied in this project. However, the nding that there is a positive link
between market integration and amount of sociality is also supported by an individual
study within this project. Ensminger (2004) is a study on the society of Orma of East
Africa, which has signicant variation in market involvement among its di¤erent societal
groups. One of the questions raised in Ensminger (2004) is whether there is an e¤ect
of market integration on the fairness norms (mean o¤ers in the experimental games
conducted) of the Orma people. Ensminger (2004) nds a strong positive e¤ect and
concludes that the behavior of the Orma people is consistent with the general nding from
the overall cross-cultural project that shows fairness increasing with market integration.
In line with the views expressed on the e¤ect of market integration on fairness in other
studies of this project, Ensminger (2004) suggests that fairness is learned in the course
of market exchange and these socializing e¤ects of the market permeate other spheres of
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everyday life. But besides this heuristic explanation, Henrich et al. (2004) essentially
leave the question of what explains this e¤ect open.
3.3 Model Extensions and Further Research Directions
In most societies, the distribution of peoples preferences is more diverse than just one
type of preference (see, e.g., Fehr & Schmidt (1999) for evidence on modern societies and
Henrich et al. (2004)  on traditional societies). In our model, to achieve a non-trivial
distribution of evolutionary stable preferences15 we could elaborate the model by having
the external market subject to random competitive shocks. For instance, a given village
under, say, normal weather conditions is reached by only a few merchants. This implies
a monopolist external market structure and game  M being played; if condition (6) is
met, then for the reasons explained above we expect inequity-averse preferences to evolve
among farmers. But suppose that at more favorable weather conditions, this village can
be reached by many merchants, leading to competition on the merchant market and game
 C played instead. In this case, farmers with selsh preferences would gain most. As a
result, depending on the stochastic process governing weather conditions, in this game, a
range of strategies could be supported in equilibrium or in some equilibrium renement,
e.g., " equilibrium (Baye & Morgan (2004)).
As already envisaged in Subsection 3.1, we can think of other mechanisms a¤ecting
the form of peoples preferences. For instance, within our model, consider an e¤ect on
peoples optimal (i.e., own-consumption-maximizing) behavior after the introduction of
a uniform sales tax on the outside good. If the tax authority aims to maximize its
tax revenues, then the model would predict people responding to the tax by reducing
inequality in wealth on the grounds similar to the monopoly case studied above. On the
other hand, if the tax imposed by the tax authority is negligible, then it would not have
much impact on peoples behavior. In other words, the importance of the governments
role in the economy can also shape the appearance of peoples preferences, with its more
central role adding to more inequity aversion.
Relevantly, an interesting research question is: From the rationalistic own-consumption-
maximization perspective, raised in Introduction, what is the optimal endowment (in-
come) distribution that maximizes the dictators utility? This is a di¤erent question
from the one studied here, where the players maximize their subjective preferences char-
acterized by the subjective utility US in (1). In game  M , it may not be optimal for the
dictator to split the remaining endowment evenly among the other players, provided he
nds it optimal to give away some of the endowment. Instead, the dictator can do better
by dividing the remaining endowment unevenly as it can be seen from the special case of
N = 3 with the net utility function U quasi-linear in price p.
15 ... besides that due to migration between villages...
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a model, where assuming that increased consumption means
increased individual tness we show how inequity-averse preferences can survive evolu-
tionary pressures in societies exposed to market exchange. Our results are based on the
observation that a reduction in ones own share in favor of less income inequality can in-
crease the purchasing power of ones own, even reduced, share. This e¤ect stems from the
inability of markets under asymmetric information to extract all the rents from buyers.
As a result, information rents available from trade can amply o¤set the direct utility loss
from sharing with others. We also present this result as an explanation of the empirical
nding of Henrich et al. (2004) that in market-integrated societies people have stronger
pro-social preferences than they do in isolated societies.
Finally, an important condition for our result to hold is that markets are su¢ ciently
concentrated. A way to test the predictions of our model would be to see if there is
a positive relationship between a market concentration index and measure of inequity
aversion across di¤erent countries.
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